Paper 2005/458 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2005/458 ↗
Seifert's RSA Fault Attack: Simplified Analysis and Generalizations
Abstract
Seifert recently described a new fault attack against an implementation of RSA signature verification. Here we give a simplified analysis of Seifert's attack and gauge its practicality against RSA moduli of practical sizes. We suggest an improvement to Seifert's attack which has the following consequences: if an adversary is able to cause random faults in only 4 bits of a 1024-bit RSA modulus stored in a device, then there is a greater than 50% chance that they will be able to make that device accept a signature on a message of their choice. For 2048-bit RSA, 6 bits suffice.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2005-12-31: last updated
- 2005-12-31: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2005/458
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/458,
author = {James A. Muir},
title = {Seifert's RSA Fault Attack: Simplified Analysis and Generalizations},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2005/458},
year = {2005},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/458}
}