Paper 2006/011 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2006/011 ↗
Formal Proof for the Correctness of RSA-PSS
Abstract
Formal verification is getting more and more important in computer science. However the state of the art formal verification methods in cryptography are very rudimentary. This paper is one step to provide a tool box allowing the use of formal methods in every aspect of cryptography. In this paper we give a formal specification of the RSA probabilistic signature scheme (RSA-PSS) [4] which is used as algorithm for digital signatures in the PKCS #1 v2.1 standard [7]. Additionally we show the correctness of RSA-PSS. This includes the correctness of RSA, the formal treatment of SHA-1 and the correctness of the PSS encoding method. Moreover we present a proof of concept for the feasibility of verification techniques to a standard signature algorithm.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2006-01-10: last updated
- 2006-01-10: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/011
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/011,
author = {Christina Lindenberg and Kai Wirt and Johannes Buchmann},
title = {Formal Proof for the Correctness of RSA-PSS},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/011},
year = {2006},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/011}
}