Paper 2006/056 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2006/056 ↗
Key Exchange Protocols: Security Definition, Proof Method and Applications
Abstract
We develop a compositional method for proving cryptographically sound security properties of key exchange protocols, based on a symbolic logic that is interpreted over conventional runs of a protocol against a probabilistic polynomial-time attacker. Since key indistinguishability and other previous specifications of secure key exchange suffer from specific compositionality problems, we develop a suitable specification of acceptable key generation. This definition is based on a simple game played by an adversary against a key exchange protocol and a conventional challenger characterizing secure encryption (or other primitives of interest). The method is illustrated using a sample protocol.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2006-02-15: last updated
- 2006-02-15: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/056
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/056,
author = {Anupam Datta and Ante Derek and John C. Mitchell and Bogdan Warinschi},
title = {Key Exchange Protocols: Security Definition, Proof Method and Applications},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/056},
year = {2006},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/056}
}