Paper 2006/065 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2006/065 ↗
On Expected Constant-Round Protocols for Byzantine Agreement
Abstract
In a seminal paper, Feldman and Micali (STOC '88) show an $n$-party Byzantine agreement protocol tolerating $t < n/3$ malicious parties that runs in expected constant rounds. Here, we show an expected constant-round protocol for authenticated Byzantine agreement assuming honest majority (i.e., $t < n/2$), and relying only on the existence of a secure signature scheme and a public-key infrastructure (PKI). Combined with existing results, this gives the first expected constant-round protocol for secure computation with honest majority in a point-to-point network assuming only one-way functions and a PKI. Our key technical tool --- a new primitive we introduce called moderated VSS --- also yields a simpler proof of the Feldman-Micali result. We also show a simple technique for sequential composition of protocols without simultaneous termination (something that is inherent for Byzantine agreement protocols using $o(n)$ rounds) for the case of $t<n/2$.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2006-05-23: last updated
- 2006-02-23: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/065
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/065,
author = {Jonathan Katz and Chiu-Yuen Koo},
title = {On Expected Constant-Round Protocols for Byzantine Agreement},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/065},
year = {2006},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/065}
}