Paper 2006/130 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2006/130 ↗

Simulatable Security and Polynomially Bounded Concurrent Composition

Dennis Hofheinz
Dominique Unruh
Abstract

Simulatable security is a security notion for multi-party protocols that implies strong composability features. The main definitional flavours of simulatable security are standard simulatability, universal simulatability, and black-box simulatability. All three come in "computational," "statistical" and "perfect" subflavours indicating the considered adversarial power. Universal and black-box simulatability, in all of their subflavours, are already known to guarantee that the concurrent composition even of a polynomial number of secure protocols stays secure. We show that computational standard simulatability does not allow for secure concurrent composition of polynomially many protocols, but we also show that statistical standard simulatability does. The first result assumes the existence of an interesting cryptographic tool (namely time-lock puzzles), and its proof employs a cryptographic multi-party computation in an interesting and unconventional way.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2006-04-03: last updated
2006-04-03: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2006/130
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/130,
      author = {Dennis Hofheinz and Dominique Unruh},
      title = {Simulatable Security and Polynomially Bounded Concurrent Composition},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/130},
      year = {2006},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/130}
}
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