Paper 2006/143 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2006/143 ↗
Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation
Abstract
As the core operation of many public key cryptosystems, group exponentiation is central to cryptography. Attacks on its implementation in embedded device setting is hence of great concern. Recently, implementations resisting both simple side-channel analysis and fault attacks were proposed. In this paper, we go further and present an algorithm that also inherently thwarts differential side-channel attacks in any finite abelian group with only limited time and storage overhead.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2006-10-04: last updated
- 2006-04-12: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/143
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/143,
author = {Guillaume Fumaroli and David Vigilant},
title = {Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/143},
year = {2006},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/143}
}