The Kurosawa-Desmedt Key Encapsulation is not Chosen-Ciphertext Secure

Javier Herranz; Dennis Hofheinz; Eike Kiltz

Paper 2006/207 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2006/207 ↗

The Kurosawa-Desmedt Key Encapsulation is not Chosen-Ciphertext Secure

Javier Herranz

Dennis Hofheinz

Eike Kiltz

Abstract

At CRYPTO 2004, Kurosawa and Desmedt presented a hybrid public-key encryption scheme that is chosen-ciphertext secure in the standard model. Until now it was unknown if the key-encapsulation part of the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme by itself is still chosen-ciphertext secure or not. In this short note we answer this question to the negative, namely we present a simple chosen-ciphertext attack on the Kurosawa-Desmedt key encapsulation mechanism.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2006-09-13: last updated; 2006-06-21: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2006/207
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/207,
      author = {Javier Herranz and Dennis Hofheinz and Eike Kiltz},
      title = {The Kurosawa-Desmedt Key Encapsulation is not Chosen-Ciphertext Secure},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/207},
      year = {2006},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/207}
}