Paper 2006/319 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2006/319 ↗
Forgery and Partial Key-Recovery Attacks on HMAC and NMAC Using Hash Collisions
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the security of HMAC and NMAC, both of which are hash-based message authentication codes. We present distinguishing, forgery, and partial key recovery attacks on HMAC and NMAC using collisions of MD4, MD5, SHA-0, and reduced SHA-1. Our results demonstrate that the strength of a cryptographic scheme can be greatly weakened by the insecurity of the underlying hash function.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2006-09-21: last updated
- 2006-09-21: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/319
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/319,
author = {Scott Contini and Yiqun Lisa Yin},
title = {Forgery and Partial Key-Recovery Attacks on HMAC and NMAC Using Hash Collisions},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/319},
year = {2006},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/319}
}