Paper 2006/326 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2006/326 ↗
Analyzing the HB and HB+ Protocols in the ``Large Error'' Case
Abstract
HB and HB+ are two shared-key, unidirectional authentication protocols whose extremely low computational cost makes them potentially well-suited for severely resource-constrained devices. Security of these protocols is based on the conjectured hardness of learning parity with noise; that is, learning a secret $s$ given ``noisy'' dot products of $s$ that are incorrect with probability $\epsilon$. Although the problem of learning parity with noise is meaningful for any constant $\epsilon < 1/2$, existing proofs of security for HB and HB+ only imply security when $\epsilon < 1/4$. In this note, we show how to extend these proofs to the case of arbitrary $\epsilon < 1/2$.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2006-09-28: last updated
- 2006-09-28: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/326
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/326,
author = {Jonathan Katz and Adam Smith},
title = {Analyzing the HB and HB+ Protocols in the ``Large Error'' Case},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/326},
year = {2006},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/326}
}