Paper 2006/350 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2006/350 ↗
Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of ARIA and Camellia
Abstract
This paper studies the security of the block ciphers ARIA and Camellia against impossible differential cryptanalysis. Our work improves the best impossible differential cryptanalysis of ARIA and Camellia known so far. The designers of ARIA expected no impossible differentials exist for 4-round ARIA. However, we found some nontrivial 4-round impossible differentials, which may lead to a possible attack on 6-round ARIA. Moreover, we found some nontrivial 8-round impossible differentials for Camellia, whereas only 7-round impossible differentials were previously known. By using the 8-round impossible differentials, we presented an attack on 12-round Camellia without $FL/FL^{-1}$ layers.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2006-10-20: last updated
- 2006-10-20: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/350
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/350,
author = {Wenling Wu and Wentao Zhang and Dengguo Feng},
title = {Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of ARIA and Camellia},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/350},
year = {2006},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/350}
}