Paper 2006/367 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2006/367 ↗
An Attack on a Certificateless Signature Scheme
Abstract
This paper demonstrates that a certificateless signature scheme recently proposed by Gorantla and Saxena is insecure. It is shown that an adversary who replaces the public key of a signer can then forge valid signatures for that signer without knowledge of the signer's private key.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2006-11-03: last updated
- 2006-11-03: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/367
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/367,
author = {Xuefei Cao and Kenneth G. Paterson and Weidong Kou},
title = {An Attack on a Certificateless Signature Scheme},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/367},
year = {2006},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/367}
}