Paper 2006/416 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2006/416 ↗

Authenticated Interleaved Encryption

Claude Castelluccia
Abstract

We present AIE (Authenticated Interleaved Encryption), a new scheme that allows nodes of a network to exchange messages securely (i.e. encrypted and authenticated) without sharing a common key or using public key cryptography. Our scheme is well adapted to networks, such as ad hoc, overlay or sensor networks, where nodes have limited capabilities and can share only a small number of symmetric keys. It provides privacy and integrity. An eavesdropper listening to a communication is unable to decrypt it and modify it without being detected. We show that our proposal can be used in wireless sensor networks to send encrypted packets to very dynamic sets of nodes without having to establish and maintain group keys. These sets of nodes can be explicitly specified by the source or can be specified by the network according to some criteria, such as their location, proximity to an object, temperature range. As a result, a node can, for example, send encrypted data to all the nodes within a given geographical area, without having to identify the destination nodes in advance. Finally we show that our proposal can be used to implement a secure and scalable aggregation scheme for wireless sensor networks.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2006-11-19: last updated
2006-11-19: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2006/416
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/416,
      author = {Claude Castelluccia},
      title = {Authenticated Interleaved Encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/416},
      year = {2006},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/416}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, this archive does not use cookies or embedded third party content.