Towards a Separation of Semantic and CCA Security for Public Key Encryption

Yael Gertner; Tal Malkin; Steven Myers

Paper 2006/447 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2006/447 ↗

Towards a Separation of Semantic and CCA Security for Public Key Encryption

Yael Gertner

Tal Malkin

Steven Myers

Abstract

We address the question of whether or not semantically secure public-key encryption primitives imply the existence of chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) secure primitives. We show a black-box separation, using the methodology introduced by Impagliazzo and Rudich, for a large non-trivial class of constructions. In particular, we show that if the proposed CCA construction's decryption algorithm does not query the semantically secure primitive's encryption algorithm, then the proposed construction cannot be CCA secure

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Foundations
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2006-12-04: last updated; 2006-12-04: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2006/447
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/447,
      author = {Yael Gertner and Tal Malkin and Steven Myers},
      title = {Towards a Separation of Semantic and CCA Security for Public Key Encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/447},
      year = {2006},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/447}
}