Paper 2006/453 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2006/453 ↗
Key Replacement Attack on a Certificateless Signature Scheme
Abstract
Yap, Heng and Goi propose an efficient certificateless signature scheme based on the intractability of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, and prove that the scheme is secure in the random oracle model. This paper shows that their certificateless signature scheme is vulnerable to key replacement attacks, where an adversary who replaces the public key of a signer can forge valid signatures on any messages for that signer without knowing the signer's private key.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2006-12-04: last updated
- 2006-12-04: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/453
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/453,
author = {Zhenfeng Zhang and Dengguo Feng},
title = {Key Replacement Attack on a Certificateless Signature Scheme},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/453},
year = {2006},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/453}
}