Paper 2006/454 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2006/454 ↗

How to Win the Clone Wars: \\ Efficient Periodic n-Times Anonymous Authentication

Jan Camenisch
Susan Hohenberger
Markulf Kohlweiss
Anna Lysyanskaya
Mira Meyerovich
Abstract

We create a credential system that lets a user anonymously authenticate at most $n$ times in a single time period. A user withdraws a dispenser of $n$ e-tokens. She shows an e-token to a verifier to authenticate herself; each e-token can be used only once, however, the dispenser automatically refreshes every time period. The only prior solution to this problem, due to Damgård et al.~[DDP05], uses protocols that are a factor of $k$ slower for the user and verifier, where $k$ is the security parameter. Damgård et al. also only support one authentication per time period, while we support $n$. Because our construction is based on e-cash, we can use existing techniques to identify a cheating user, trace all of her e-tokens, and revoke her dispensers. We also offer a new anonymity service: glitch protection for basically honest users who (occasionally) reuse e-tokens. The verifier can always recognize a reused e-token; however, we preserve the anonymity of users who do not reuse e-tokens too often.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2007-04-12: last updated
2006-12-04: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2006/454
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/454,
      author = {Jan Camenisch and Susan Hohenberger and Markulf Kohlweiss and Anna Lysyanskaya and Mira Meyerovich},
      title = {How to Win the Clone Wars: \\ Efficient Periodic n-Times Anonymous Authentication},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/454},
      year = {2006},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/454}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, this archive does not use cookies or embedded third party content.