Paper 2006/464 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2006/464 ↗

Remarks on "Analysis of One Popular Group Signature Scheme'' in Asiacrypt 2006

Giuseppe Ateniese
Jan Camenisch
Marc Joye
Gene Tsudik
Abstract

In \cite{Cao}, a putative framing ``attack'' against the ACJT group signature scheme \cite{ACJT00} is presented. This note shows that the attack framework considered in \cite{Cao} is \emph{invalid}. As we clearly illustrate, there is \textbf{no security weakness} in the ACJT group signature scheme as long as all the detailed specifications in \cite{ACJT00} are being followed.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2006-12-15: last updated
2006-12-08: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2006/464
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/464,
      author = {Giuseppe Ateniese and Jan Camenisch and Marc Joye and Gene Tsudik},
      title = {Remarks on "Analysis of One Popular Group Signature Scheme'' in Asiacrypt 2006},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/464},
      year = {2006},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/464}
}
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