Paper 2007/191 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2007/191 ↗
Deniable Internet Key-Exchange
Abstract
In this work, we develop a family of protocols for deniable Internet Key-Exchange (IKE) with the following properties: 1. item Highly practical efficiency, and conceptual simplicity and clarity. 2. Forward and concurrent (non-malleable) deniability against adversaries with arbitrary auxiliary inputs, and better privacy protection of players' roles. 3. Provable security in the Canetti-Krawczyk post-specified-peer model, and maintenance of essential security properties not captured by the Canetti-Krawczyk security model. 4. Compatibility with the widely deployed and standardized SIGMA (i.e., the basis of IKEv2) and (H)MQV protocols, when parties possess DL public-keys. Our protocols could potentially serve, in part, as either the underlying basis or a useful alternative for the next generation of IKE (i.e., IKEv3) of IPsec (in particular, when deniability is desired). In view of the wide deployment and use of IKE and increasing awareness of privacy protection (especially for E-commerce over Internet), this work is naturally of practical interest.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2007-06-22: last updated
- 2007-05-23: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2007/191
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/191,
author = {Andrew C. C. Yao and Frances F. Yao and Yunlei Zhao and Bin Zhu},
title = {Deniable Internet Key-Exchange},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2007/191},
year = {2007},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/191}
}