Paper 2007/199 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2007/199 ↗
A Framework for Game-Based Security Proofs
Abstract
Information security is nowadays an important issue. Its essential ingredient is cryptography. A common way to present security proofs is to structure them as sequences of games. The main contribution of this paper is a framework which refines this approach. We make explicit important theorems used implicitly by cryptographers but never explicitly stated. Our aim is to have a framework in which proofs are precise enough to be mechanically checked, and readable enough to be humanly checked. We illustrate the use of our framework by proving in a systematic way the so-called semantic security of the encryption scheme ElGamal and its hashed version. All proofs have been mechanically checked in the proof assistant Coq.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2007-11-07: last updated
- 2007-05-31: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2007/199
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/199,
author = {David Nowak},
title = {A Framework for Game-Based Security Proofs},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2007/199},
year = {2007},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/199}
}