Paper 2007/364 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2007/364 ↗
A Proof of Security of a Mesh Security Architecture
Abstract
The IEEE 802.11s standard is tasked to provide ways of establishing and securing a wireless mesh network. One proposal establishes a Mesh Security Architecture (MSA), with an interesting key hierarchy and full protocol definitions. This paper proves the correctness and security of the MSA proposal and its corresponding protocols. We also propose and prove the security of an additional protocol (an abbreviated handshake) which offers a substantial efficiency improvement in certain instances. To prove the entire architecture secure, we utilize Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) to prove each protocol secure. From that basis, we can show the protocols compose securely to prove the entire architecture. We also contribute some novel concepts to PCL, to allow us to prove the security of the overall architecture.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2007-09-13: last updated
- 2007-09-13: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2007/364
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/364,
author = {Doug Kuhlman and Ryan Moriarty and Tony Braskich and Steve Emeott and Mahesh Tripunitara},
title = {A Proof of Security of a Mesh Security Architecture},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2007/364},
year = {2007},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/364}
}