Paper 2007/372 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2007/372 ↗
On the Authentication of One Popular Signcryption Scheme
Abstract
Whether a recipient \textit{can prove} a signature to others is of great importance. The function is just one reason that we call a signature ``signature" rather than others. In this paper, we point out that one popular signcryption signature convinces \textit{only} the designated document's recipient that the signer deliberately signed the document. The \textit{designated recipient} can \textit{check} the validity of a given signcryptext but \textit{cannot prove} it to others. We also improve it using the efficient technique developed in Schnorr's signature instead of a zero-knowledge proof such that the receiver can \textit{check} the validity of a given signcryptext and \textit{can prove} it to a third party.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2007-09-19: last updated
- 2007-09-19: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2007/372
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/372,
author = {Zhengjun Cao},
title = {On the Authentication of One Popular Signcryption Scheme},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2007/372},
year = {2007},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/372}
}