Paper 2007/480 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2007/480 ↗
Differential Fault Analysis on the AES Key Schedule
Abstract
This letter proposes a differential fault analysis on the AES key schedule and shows how an entire 128-bit AES key can be retrieved. In the workshop at FDTC 2007, we presented the DFA mechanism on the AES key schedule and proposed general attack rules. Using our proposed rules, we showed an efficient attack that can retrieve 80 bits of the 128-bit key. Recently, we have found a new attack that can obtain an additional 8 bits compared with our previous attack. As a result, we present most efficient attack for retrieving 88 bits of the 128-bit key using approximately two pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2007-12-28: last updated
- 2007-12-28: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2007/480
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/480,
author = {Junko Takahashi and Toshinori Fukunaga},
title = {Differential Fault Analysis on the AES Key Schedule},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2007/480},
year = {2007},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/480}
}