Paper 2008/028 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2008/028 ↗

HB#: Increasing the Security and Efficiency of HB+

Henri Gilbert
Matthew J. B. Robshaw
Yannick Seurin
Abstract

The innovative HB+ protocol of Juels and Weis [10] extends device authentication to low-cost RFID tags. However, despite the very simple on-tag computation there remain some practical problems with HB+ and despite an elegant proof of security against some limited active attacks, there is a simple man-in-the-middle attack due to Gilbert et al. [8]. In this paper we consider improvements to HB+ in terms of both security and practicality. We introduce a new protocol that we denote random-HB#. This proposal avoids many practical drawbacks of HB+, remains provably resistant to attacks in the model of Juels and Weis, and at the same time is provably resistant to a broader class of active attacks that includes the attack of [8]. We then describe an enhanced variant called HB# which offers practical advantages over HB+.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2008-01-22: last updated
2008-01-22: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2008/028
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/028,
      author = {Henri Gilbert and Matthew J. B.  Robshaw and Yannick Seurin},
      title = {HB#: Increasing the Security and Efficiency of HB+},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2008/028},
      year = {2008},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/028}
}
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