Paper 2008/053 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2008/053 ↗
Breaking One-Round Key-Agreement Protocols in the Random Oracle Model
Abstract
In this work we deal with one-round key-agreement protocols, called Merkle's Puzzles, in the random oracle model, where the players Alice and Bob are allowed to query a random permutation oracle $n$ times. We prove that Eve can always break the protocol by querying the oracle $O(n^2)$ times. The long-time unproven optimality of the quadratic bound in the fully general, multi-round scenario has been proven recently by Barak and Mahmoody-Ghidary. The results in this paper have been found independently of their work.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2008-01-31: last updated
- 2008-01-31: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2008/053
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/053,
author = {Miroslava Sotakova},
title = {Breaking One-Round Key-Agreement Protocols in the Random Oracle Model},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2008/053},
year = {2008},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/053}
}