Paper 2008/059 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2008/059 ↗

Buying random votes is as hard as buying no-votes

Stefan Popoveniuc
Jonathan Stanton
Abstract

In voting systems where a mark in a fixed position may mean a vote for Alice on a ballot,and a vote for Bob on another ballot, an attacker may coerce voters to put their mark at a certain position, enforcing effectively a random vote. This attack is meaningful if the voting system allows to take receipts with them and/or posts them to a bulletin board. The coercer may also ask for a blank receipt. We analyze this kind of attack and prove that it requires the same effort as a comparable attack would require against any voting system, even one without receipts.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2008-02-03: last updated
2008-02-03: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2008/059
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/059,
      author = {Stefan Popoveniuc and Jonathan Stanton},
      title = {Buying random votes is as hard as buying no-votes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2008/059},
      year = {2008},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/059}
}
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