Paper 2008/479 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2008/479 ↗
Formal Proof of Relative Strengths of Security between ECK2007 Model and other Proof Models for Key Agreement Protocols
Abstract
In 2005, Choo, Boyd & Hitchcock compared four well-known indistinguishability-based proof models for key agreement protocols, which contains the Bellare & Rogaway (1993, 1995) model, the Bellare , Pointcheval & Rogaway 2000 model and the Canetti & Krawczyk (2001) model. After that, researchers from Microsoft presented a stronger security model, called Extended Canetti-Krawczyk model (2007). In this paper, we will point out the differences between the new proof model and the four previous models, and analyze the relative strengths of security of these models. To support the implication or non-implication relation between these models, we will provide proof or counter-example.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2008-11-22: last updated
- 2008-11-18: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2008/479
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/479,
author = {Jinyue Xia and Jiandong Wang and Liming Fang and Yongjun Ren and Shizhu Bian},
title = {Formal Proof of Relative Strengths of Security between ECK2007 Model and other Proof Models for Key Agreement Protocols},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2008/479},
year = {2008},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/479}
}