Cryptanalysis of RadioGatun

Thomas Fuhr; Thomas Peyrin

Paper 2008/515 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2008/515 ↗

Cryptanalysis of RadioGatun

Thomas Fuhr

Thomas Peyrin

Abstract

In this paper we study the security of the RadioGatun family of hash functions, and more precisely the collision resistance of this proposal. We show that it is possible to find differential paths with acceptable probability of success. Then, by using the freedom degrees available from the incoming message words, we provide a significant improvement over the best previously known cryptanalysis. As a proof of concept, we provide a colliding pair of messages for RadioGatun with 2-bit words. We finally argue that, under some light assumption, our technique is very likely to provide the first collision attack on RadioGatun.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2008-12-19: last updated; 2008-12-09: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2008/515
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/515,
      author = {Thomas Fuhr and Thomas Peyrin},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of RadioGatun},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2008/515},
      year = {2008},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/515}
}