Paper 2009/044 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2009/044 ↗
Un-Trusted-HB: Security Vulnerabilities of Trusted-HB
Abstract
With increased use of passive RFID tags, the need for secure lightweight identification protocols arose. HB+ is one such protocol, which was proven secure in the detection-based model, but shown breakable by man-in-the-middle attacks. Trusted-HB is a variant of HB+, specifically designed to resist man-in-the-middle attacks. In this paper, we discuss several weaknesses of Trusted-HB, show that the formal security proof provided by its designers is incorrect, and demonstrate how to break it in realistic scenarios.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2009-01-29: last updated
- 2009-01-29: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2009/044
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/044,
author = {Dmitry Frumkin and Adi Shamir},
title = {Un-Trusted-HB: Security Vulnerabilities of Trusted-HB},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/044},
year = {2009},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/044}
}