Paper 2009/064 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2009/064 ↗

On the Data Complexity of Statistical Attacks Against Block Ciphers (full version)

Céline Blondeau
Benoît Gérard
Abstract

Many attacks on iterated block ciphers rely on statistical considerations using plaintext/ciphertext pairs to distinguish some part of the cipher from a random permutation. We provide here a simple formula for estimating the amount of plaintext/ciphertext pairs which is needed for such distinguishers and which applies to a lot of different scenarios (linear cryptanalysis, differential-linear cryptanalysis, differential/truncated differential/impossible differential cryptanalysis). The asymptotic data complexities of all these attacks are then derived. Moreover, we give an efficient algorithm for computing the data complexity accurately.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2009-02-12: last updated
2009-02-10: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2009/064
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/064,
      author = {Céline Blondeau and Benoît Gérard},
      title = {On the Data Complexity of Statistical Attacks Against Block Ciphers (full version)},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/064},
      year = {2009},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/064}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, this archive does not use cookies or embedded third party content.