Paper 2009/102 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2009/102 ↗

A Step Towards QC Blind Signatures

Abstract

In this paper we propose a conversion from signature schemes connected to coding theory into blind signature schemes. We give formal security reductions to combinatorial problems not connected to number theory. This is the first blind signature scheme which can not be broken by quantum computers via cryptanalyzing the underlying signature scheme employing Shor’s algorithms. We thus present a step towards diversifying computational assumptions on which blind signatures can be based. We achieve blind signatures by a different concept of blinding: Instead of blinding the message, we blind the public key, such that generating a (blind) signature for the blinded key requires the interaction of the holder of the original secret key. To verify the blind signature, the connection between the original and the blinded key is proven by a static ZK proof. The major ingredient for our conversion is the PKP protocol by Shamir.