Paper 2009/112 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2009/112 ↗
A 2nd-Preimage Attack on AURORA-512
Abstract
In this note, we present a 2nd-preimage attack on AURORA-512, which is one of the candidates for SHA-3. Our attack can generate 2nd-preimages of any given message, in particular, the attack complexity becomes optimal when the message length is 9 blocks or more. In such a case, the attack complexity is approximately $2^{290}$ AURORA-512 operations, which is less than the brute force attack on AURORA-512, namely, $2^{512-\log_2{9}}\approx2^{508}$. Our attack exploits some weakness in the mode of operation.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2009-03-11: last updated
- 2009-03-11: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2009/112
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/112,
author = {Yu Sasaki},
title = {A 2nd-Preimage Attack on AURORA-512},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/112},
year = {2009},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/112}
}