Paper 2009/125 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2009/125 ↗
A Full Key Recovery Attack on HMAC-AURORA-512
Abstract
In this note, we present a full key recovery attack on HMAC-AURORA-512 when 512-bit secret keys are used and the MAC length is 512-bit long. Our attack requires $2^{257}$ queries and the off-line complexity is $2^{259}$ AURORA-512 operations, which is significantly less than the complexity of the exhaustive search for a 512-bit key. The attack can be carried out with a negligible amount of memory. Our attack can also recover the inner-key of HMAC-AURORA-384 with almost the same complexity as in HMAC-AURORA-512. This attack does not recover the outer-key of HMAC-AURORA-384, but universal forgery is possible by combining the inner-key recovery and 2nd-preimage attacks. Our attack exploits some weaknesses in the mode of operation.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2009-03-20: last updated
- 2009-03-20: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2009/125
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/125,
author = {Yu Sasaki},
title = {A Full Key Recovery Attack on HMAC-AURORA-512},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/125},
year = {2009},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/125}
}