Paper 2009/135 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2009/135 ↗
Practical Key Recovery Attack against Secret-prefix Edon-R
Abstract
Edon-R is one of the fastest SHA-3 candidate. In this paper we study the security of Edon-R, and we show that using Edon-R as a MAC with the secret prefix construction is unsafe. We present a practical attack in the case of Edon-R256, which requires 32 queries, 2^30 computations, negligible memory, and a precomputation of 2^50 . This does not directly contradict the security claims of Edon-R or the NIST requirements for SHA-3, but we believe it shows a strong weakness in the design.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2009-06-03: last updated
- 2009-03-27: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2009/135
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/135,
author = {Gaëtan Leurent},
title = {Practical Key Recovery Attack against Secret-prefix Edon-R},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/135},
year = {2009},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/135}
}