Paper 2009/164 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2009/164 ↗

CCA-Secure Proxy Re-Encryption without Pairings

Abstract

In a proxy re-encryption scheme, a semi-trusted proxy can transform a ciphertext under Alice's public key into another ciphertext that Bob can decrypt. However, the proxy cannot access the plaintext. Due to its transformation property, proxy re-encryption can be used in many applications, such as encrypted email forwarding. In this paper, by using signature of knowledge and Fijisaki-Okamoto conversion, we propose a proxy re-encryption scheme \emph{without} pairings, in which the proxy can only transform the ciphertext in one direction. The proposal is secure against chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) and collusion attack in the \emph{random oracle model} based on Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption over $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$ and integer factorization assumption, respectively. To the best of our knowledge, it is the \emph{first} unidirectional PRE scheme with CCA security and collusion-resistance.