Paper 2009/175 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2009/175 ↗
Concrete Security for Entity Recognition: The Jane Doe Protocol (Full Paper)
Abstract
Entity recognition does not ask whether the message is from some entity X, just whether a message is from the same entity as a previous message. This turns turns out to be very useful for low-end devices. Motivated by an attack against a protocol presented at SAC 2003, the current paper proposes a new protocol -- the ``Jane Doe Protocol'' --, and provides a formal proof of its concrete security. The protocol neither employs asymmetric cryptography, nor a trusted third party, nor any key pre-distribution. It is suitable for light-weight cryptographic devices such as sensor network motes and RFID tags.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2009-04-23: last updated
- 2009-04-23: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2009/175
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/175,
author = {Stefan Lucks and Erik Zenner and Andre Weimerskirch and Dirk Westhoff},
title = {Concrete Security for Entity Recognition: The Jane Doe Protocol (Full Paper)},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/175},
year = {2009},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/175}
}