Paper 2009/302 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2009/302 ↗

Cryptanalysis of ESSENCE

Maria Naya-Plasencia
Andrea Röck
Jean-Philippe Aumasson
Yann Laigle-Chapuy
Gaëtan Leurent
Willi Meier
Thomas Peyrin
Abstract

ESSENCE is a hash function submitted to the NIST Hash Competition that stands out as a hardware-friendly and highly parallelizable design. Previous analysis showed some non-randomness in the compression function which could not be extended to an attack on the hash function and ESSENCE remained unbroken. Preliminary analysis in its documentation argues that it resists standard differential cryptanalysis. This paper disproves this claim, showing that advanced techniques can be used to significantly reduce the cost of such attacks: using a manually found differential characteristic and an advanced search algorithm, we obtain collision attacks on the full ESSENCE-256 and ESSENCE-512, with respective complexities 2^67.4 and 2^134.7. In addition, we show how to use these attacks to forge valid (message, MAC) pairs for HMAC-ESSENCE-256 and HMAC-ESSENCE-512, essentially at the same cost as a collision.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2010-01-27: last updated
2009-06-24: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2009/302
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/302,
      author = {Maria Naya-Plasencia and Andrea Röck and Jean-Philippe Aumasson and Yann Laigle-Chapuy and Gaëtan Leurent and Willi Meier and Thomas Peyrin},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of ESSENCE},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/302},
      year = {2009},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/302}
}
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