Paper 2009/428 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2009/428 ↗
Efficiently from Semi-honest to Malicious OT via OLFE
Abstract
A combiner securely implements a functionality out of a set implementations of another functionality from which some may be insecure. We present two efficient combiners for oblivious linear function evaluation (OLFE). The first is a constant-rate OLFE combiner in the semi-honest model, the second combiner implements Rabin string oblivious transfer (RabinOT) from OLFE in the malicious model. As an application, we show a very efficient reductions in the malicious model of RabinOT over strings to one-out-of-two oblivious transfer over bits (OT) that is only secure in the semi-honest model. For string of size $\ell = \omega(k^2)$, our reductions uses only $4 \ell + o(\ell)$ instances of OT, while previous results required $\Omega(\ell k^2)$. Our new reduction leads to an efficiency improvement for general multi-party computation (MPC) based on semi-honest OT, and makes it almost as efficient as MPC based on malicious OT. All reductions are unconditionally secure, black-box, universally composable and secure against adaptive adversaries.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2009-09-04: last updated
- 2009-09-04: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2009/428
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/428,
author = {Jürg Wullschleger},
title = {Efficiently from Semi-honest to Malicious OT via OLFE},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/428},
year = {2009},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/428}
}