Key Recovery Attack on QuiSci

Nils Reimers

Paper 2009/500 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2009/500 ↗

Key Recovery Attack on QuiSci

Nils Reimers

Abstract

This paper shows a key recovery attack on QuiSci (quick stream cipher), designed by Stefan Müller (FGAN-FHR, a German research institute) in 2001. With one or few know plaintexts it's possible to recover most of the key with negligible time complexity. This paper shows a way how to exploit the weak key setup of QuiSci.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2009-10-20: last updated; 2009-10-20: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2009/500
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/500,
      author = {Nils Reimers},
      title = {Key Recovery Attack on QuiSci},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/500},
      year = {2009},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/500}
}