Paper 2009/575 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2009/575 ↗
Differential Fault Analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard using a Single Fault
Abstract
In this paper we present an enhanced Differential Fault Attack that can be applied to the AES using a single fault. We demonstrate that when a single random byte fault is induced that affects the input of the eighth round, the AES key can be deduced using a two stage algorithm. The first step, would be expected to reduce the possible key hypotheses to $2^{32}$, and the second step to a mere $2^{8}$. Furthermore, we show that, with certain faults, this can be further reduced to two key hypotheses.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2011-02-17: last updated
- 2009-12-01: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2009/575
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/575,
author = {Michael Tunstall and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay},
title = {Differential Fault Analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard using a Single Fault},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/575},
year = {2009},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/575}
}