Public-Key Cryptographic Primitives Provably as Secure as Subset Sum

Vadim Lyubashevsky; Adriana Palacio; Gil Segev

Paper 2009/576 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2009/576 ↗

Public-Key Cryptographic Primitives Provably as Secure as Subset Sum

Vadim Lyubashevsky

Adriana Palacio

Gil Segev

Abstract

We propose a semantically-secure public-key encryption scheme whose security is polynomial-time equivalent to the hardness of solving random instances of the subset sum problem. The subset sum assumption required for the security of our scheme is weaker than that of existing subset-sum based encryption schemes, namely the lattice-based schemes of Ajtai and Dwork (STOC '97), Regev (STOC '03, STOC '05), and Peikert (STOC '09). Additionally, our proof of security is simple and direct. We also present a natural variant of our scheme that is secure against key-leakage attacks, as well as an oblivious transfer protocol that is secure against semi-honest adversaries.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2009-12-01: last updated; 2009-12-01: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2009/576
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/576,
      author = {Vadim Lyubashevsky and Adriana Palacio and Gil Segev},
      title = {Public-Key Cryptographic Primitives Provably as Secure as Subset Sum},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/576},
      year = {2009},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/576}
}