Paper 2009/624 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2009/624 ↗
Security Analysis of the PACE Key-Agreement Protocol
Abstract
We analyze the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) protocol for authenticated key agreement, recently proposed by the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) for the deployment in machine readable travel documents. We show that the PACE protocol is secure in the real-or-random sense of Abdalla, Fouque and Pointcheval, under a number-theoretic assumption related to the Diffie-Hellman problem and assuming random oracles and ideal ciphers.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2009-12-26: last updated
- 2009-12-26: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2009/624
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/624,
author = {Jens Bender and Marc Fischlin and Dennis Kuegler},
title = {Security Analysis of the PACE Key-Agreement Protocol},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/624},
year = {2009},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/624}
}