Paper 2010/023 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2010/023 ↗
Differential Fault Analysis on AES with 192 and 256-Bit Keys
Abstract
This paper describes a differential fault analysis (DFA) on AES with 192 and 256-bit keys. We show a new attack in which both 192 and 256-bit keys are retrieved within a feasible computational time. In order to verify the proposed attack and estimate the calculation time, we implement the proposed attack using C code on a PC. As a result, we successfully recover the original 192-bit key using 3 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts within 5 minutes, and 256-bit key using 2 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts and 2 pairs of correct and faulty plaintexts within 10 minutes.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2010-01-16: last updated
- 2010-01-16: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2010/023
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/023,
author = {Junko Takahashi and Toshinori Fukunaga},
title = {Differential Fault Analysis on AES with 192 and 256-Bit Keys},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/023},
year = {2010},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/023}
}