Paper 2010/165 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2010/165 ↗

Comment on four two-party authentication protocols

Yalin Chen
Jue-Sam Chou
Chun-Hui Huang
Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the protocols of Bindu et al., Goriparthi et al., Wang et al. and Hölbl et al.. After analyses, we found that Bindu et al.’s protocol suffers from the insider attack if the smart card is lost, both Goriparthi et al.’s and Wang et al.’s protocols can’t withstand the DoS attack on the password change phase which makes the password invalid after the protocol run, and Hölbl et al.’s protocol is vulnerable to the insider attack since a malevolent legal user can deduce KGC’s secret key xs.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2010-03-28: last updated
2010-03-28: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2010/165
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/165,
      author = {Yalin Chen and Jue-Sam Chou and Chun-Hui Huang},
      title = {Comment on four two-party authentication protocols},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/165},
      year = {2010},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/165}
}
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