Paper 2010/191 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2010/191 ↗
On Designated Verifier Signature Schemes
Abstract
Designated verifier signature schemes allow a signer to convince only the designated verifier that a signed message is authentic. We define attack models on the unforgeability property of such schemes and analyze relationships among the models. We show that the no-message model, where an adversary is given only public keys, is equivalent to the model, where an adversary has also oracle access to the verification algorithm. We also show a separation between the no-message model and the chosen-message model, where an adversary has access to the signing algorithm. Furthermore, we present a modification of the Yang-Liao designated verifier signature scheme and prove its security. The security of the modified scheme is based on the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, while the original scheme requires strong Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2010-06-29: last updated
- 2010-04-09: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2010/191
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/191,
author = {Michal Rjaško and Martin Stanek},
title = {On Designated Verifier Signature Schemes},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/191},
year = {2010},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/191}
}