Paper 2010/223 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2010/223 ↗

Improved Differential Attacks for ECHO and Grostl

Thomas Peyrin
Abstract

We present improved cryptanalysis of two second-round SHA-3 candidates: the AES-based hash functions ECHO and GROSTL. We explain methods for building better differential trails for ECHO by increasing the granularity of the truncated differential paths previously considered. In the case of GROSTL, we describe a new technique, the internal differential attack, which shows that when using parallel computations designers should also consider the differential security between the parallel branches. Then, we exploit the recently introduced start-from-the-middle or Super-Sbox attacks, that proved to be very efficient when attacking AES-like permutations, to achieve a very efficient utilization of the available freedom degrees. Finally, we obtain the best known attacks so far for both ECHO and GROSTL. In particular, we are able to mount a distinguishing attack for the full GROSTL-256 compression function.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2010-08-12: last updated
2010-04-28: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2010/223
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/223,
      author = {Thomas Peyrin},
      title = {Improved Differential Attacks for ECHO and Grostl},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/223},
      year = {2010},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/223}
}
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