Paper 2010/435 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2010/435 ↗

The Improbable Differential Attack: Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round CLEFIA

Cihangir Tezcan
Abstract

In this paper we present a new statistical cryptanalytic technique that we call improbable differential cryptanalysis which uses a differential that is less probable when the correct key is used. We provide data complexity estimates for this kind of attacks and we also show a method to expand impossible differentials to improbable differentials. By using this expansion method, we cryptanalyze 13, 14, and 15-round CLEFIA for the key sizes of length 128, 192, and 256 bits, respectively. These are the best cryptanalytic results on CLEFIA up to this date.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2010-10-16: last updated
2010-08-13: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2010/435
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/435,
      author = {Cihangir Tezcan},
      title = {The Improbable Differential Attack: Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round CLEFIA},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/435},
      year = {2010},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/435}
}
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