Paper 2010/463 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2010/463 ↗
Passive Cryptanalysis of the UnConditionally Secure Authentication Protocol for RFID Systems
Abstract
Recently, Alomair et al. proposed the rst UnConditionally Secure mutual authentication protocol for low-cost RFID systems(UCS- RFID). The security of the UCS-RFID relies on ve dynamic secret keys which are updated at every protocol run using a fresh random number (nonce) secretly transmitted from a reader to tags. Our results show that, at the highest security level of the protocol (security parameter= 256), inferring a nonce is feasible with the probability of 0.99 by eavesdropping(observing) about 90 runs of the protocol. Finding a nonce enables a passive attacker to recover all ve secret keys of the protocol. To do so, we propose a three-phase probabilistic approach in this paper. Our attack recovers the secret keys with a probability that increases by accessing more protocol runs. We also show that tracing a tag using this protocol is also possible even with less runs of the protocol.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2011-01-04: last updated
- 2010-09-01: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2010/463
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/463,
author = {Mohammad Reza Sohizadeh Abyaneh},
title = {Passive Cryptanalysis of the UnConditionally Secure Authentication Protocol for RFID Systems},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/463},
year = {2010},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/463}
}