Side-Channel Attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter Public-Key Cryptosystems

R. M.  Avanzi; S.  Hoerder; D.  Page; M.  Tunstall

Paper 2010/479 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2010/479 ↗

Side-Channel Attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter Public-Key Cryptosystems

R. M. Avanzi

S. Hoerder

D. Page

M. Tunstall

Abstract

Research within “post-quantum” cryptography has focused on development of schemes that resist quantum cryptanalysis. However, if such schemes are to be deployed, practical questions of efficiency and physical security should also be addressed; this is particularly important for embedded systems. To this end, we investigate issues relating to side-channel attack against the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems, for example improving those presented by [19], and novel countermeasures against such attack.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2010-09-14: last updated; 2010-09-12: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2010/479
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/479,
      author = {R. M.  Avanzi and S.  Hoerder and D.  Page and M.  Tunstall},
      title = {Side-Channel Attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter Public-Key Cryptosystems},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/479},
      year = {2010},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/479}
}