Paper 2010/508 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2010/508 ↗

A Fault Analytic Method against HB+

Jose Carrijo
Rafael Tonicelli
Anderson C. A. Nascimento
Abstract

The search for lightweight authentication protocols suitable for low-cost RFID tags constitutes an active and challenging research area. In this context, a family of protocols based on the LPN problem has been proposed: the so-called HB-family. Despite the rich literature regarding the cryptanalysis of these protocols, there are no published results about the impact of fault analysis over them. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by presenting a fault analytic method against a prominent member of the HB-family: HB+ protocol. We demonstrate that the fault analysis model can lead to a flexible and effective attack against HB-like protocols, posing a serious threat over them.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2010-10-05: last updated
2010-10-05: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2010/508
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/508,
      author = {Jose Carrijo and Rafael Tonicelli and Anderson C.  A.  Nascimento},
      title = {A Fault Analytic Method against HB+},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/508},
      year = {2010},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/508}
}
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