Paper 2010/582 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2010/582 ↗
Secret Key Leakage from Public Key Perturbation of DLP-based Cryptosystems
Abstract
Finding efficient countermeasures for cryptosystems against fault attacks is challenged by a constant discovery of flaws in designs. Even elements, such as public keys, that do not seem critical must be protected. From the attacks against RSA, we develop a new attack of DLP-based cryptosystems, built in addition on a lattice analysis to recover DSA public keys from partially known nonces. Based on a realistic fault model, our attack only requires 16 faulty signatures to recover a 160-bit DSA secret key within a few minutes on a standard PC. These results significantly improves the previous public element fault attack in the context of DLP-based cryptosystems.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2010-11-18: last updated
- 2010-11-18: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2010/582
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/582,
author = {Alexandre Berzati and Cécile Canovas-Dumas and Louis Goubin},
title = {Secret Key Leakage from Public Key Perturbation of DLP-based Cryptosystems},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/582},
year = {2010},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/582}
}