Paper 2010/618 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2010/618 ↗
A Forgery Attack on the Candidate LTE Integrity Algorithm 128-EIA3
Abstract
In this note we show that the message authentication code 128-EIA3 considered for adoption as one of the integrity algorithms of the emerging mobile standard LTE is vulnerable to a simple existential forgery attack. This attack allows, given any message and the associated MAC value under an unknown integrity key and an initial vector, to predict the MAC value of a related message under the same key and the same initial vector with a success probability 1/2.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2010-12-08: last updated
- 2010-12-08: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2010/618
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/618,
author = {Thomas Fuhr and Henri Gilbert and Jean-Renë Reinhard and Marion Videau},
title = {A Forgery Attack on the Candidate LTE Integrity Algorithm 128-EIA3},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/618},
year = {2010},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/618}
}